In summer 1997 the German ‘Group of Experts’ decided to have a look at the wreck and to film the relevant parts of the wreck and its surroundings. For documentation purposes this was planned to be performed by a ROV able to produce high quality video footage.

citizens.
In order to avoid that in case of failure the attention would be drawn straight away to the German ‘Group of Experts’ the operation was camouflaged under the project “Prominent Wrecks in the Baltic” – code name The “Plus” Project – by the Polish/German POL-GER Film Company with the assistance of a Polish consultant.
Preparations commenced at the end of June and only very few people were involved and sworn to the strictest confidence. Frequent checks of the wreck position revealed that there was no guard vessel. On the other hand it was, of course, to be expected that the position would be controlled 24 hours per day by radar from the Finnish Island Utö, possibly also from the Estonian Island Hiumaa. Since it would take a Swedish or Finnish vessel 4-5 hours to arrive on site there would be sufficient time to do the job before any interference would be possible.
It was relatively easy to find a suitable German tug – the “Fairplay VII” – with Schottel drive, proper GPS – echo sounding equipment, however, it was very difficult to find a good ROV because this equipment was busy in the offshore area as usual during the summer months. After considerable problems a ROV was finally found in Aberdeen and after respective modifications of the tug had been carried out, it was installed onboard at Warnemünde. Photos 1-8 of the attached photo documentation show tug and installation activities at Warnemünde. On 15.08.97 at 21.30 hours the port was left for the wreck position. On the following day the two English ROV operators installed and adjusted their equipment – see photos 9-14 and after several test dives the ROV was fit for use. The weather was calm and warm, the forecast good – see photos 15-16 – excellent conditions for the operation planned.
A final check from onboard one of the Helsinki ferries on Friday morning – 15.08.97 – revealed that there was no guard vessel.
(* England and Poland subsequently ratified the Treaty. )

The arrival time was fixed for Sunday, 17.08.97 at 21.00 hours, i.e. one hour after sunset.
In the course of the afternoon the ROV operators were informed about the actual target and the following preparations carried out:

• The ROV operators were made acquainted with the wreck by means of the Finnish ROV videos.
  
  
• It was determined to start at the stern area with the investigation of the sea bottom West of the stern, the two stern ramps, then follow the starboard bilge keel towards the bow thrusters and examine the area between mudline and bilge keel, subsequently film the relevant parts of the bow ramp, front bulkhead and forecastle deck and look through the starboard visor actuator opening into the void space below (B-deck).
  
  
• In case the hole in the starboard side should be found and turn out to be large enough, enter into the vessel.
  
  

• If time should permit, return to the stern and film as much as possible of the sea bottom around the wreck.
  

The maximum time available was fixed at 4 hours for the ROV operators since it had to be expected that after this time the Coast Guard vessel would be approaching with unknown consequences.
The course was set to Utö with the area around the ESTONIA wreck to starboard. At about 19.45 hours a strong echo was observed on the radar at 10 nm distance which was subsequently noted to be stationary, probably an anchor layer, at a position ca. 5 nm WNW of the ESTONIA position, presumably a guard vessel, thus trouble was to be expected much sooner than expected. The forthcoming decision had to be made with due consideration of the following circumstances:

(1) The tug master had been instructed by his owners to follow the coast guard vessel into a Swedish or Finnish port, if this should be demanded.

(2) The value of the ROV equipment was said to be about DM 1 Mill. and it was questionable whether it would be insured in case of loss because the action could be considered illegal.

(3) The actual background of the operation had by all means to remain anonymous.

Thereafter Åle circled around the tug with considerable speed and the tug was rolling and pitching, rocking as in heavy weather which made the work with the ROV impossible. After due consideration of the available options, i.e.

• the risk of being escorted into a Finnish or Swedish port and then being exposed to the respective justice department with a totally incalculable time risk,
  
  
• the risk of loosing the ROV with garage and ca. 150 m of umbilical in a prohibited area with little or no chance of recovery,

it was decided to make one more attempt and after ca. 30 minutes of watching each other – Åle drifting at a distance of ca. 100 m – preparations were made to lower the ROV again, however as soon as this was realised by Åle, the icebreaker again began to circle around the tug at considerable speed which started to move as explained before and it was decided to discontinue the operation and the tug proceeded to the south closely followed by the icebreaker for about 6 nm. Thereafter the icebreaker returned to its previous anchor position, while the tug turned to the east and joined the quite busy northbound shipping lane heading for the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) NW of Hiumaa. The tug proceeded on parallel course but to the east of several large vessels in their radar shadow. When the longitude of the ESTONIA was passed the tug turned north across both lanes of the TSS and about 4 nm south of the ESTONIA position, the lights were switched off and with very slow speed and current more or less drifted towards the wreck position. At a distance of about 1 nm the garage with ROV was lowered into the water in total darkness just hit by the moon. However, at this moment the searchlight and navigation lights on Åle were switched on again and it could be seen on the radar shortly later that the icebreaker was starting to proceed in the direction of the tug again with increasing speed.
Consequently it was decided to cancel the hopeless operation and return to base. On 19.08.97 at 22.00 hours the tug was back at Warnemünde.
The costs for this prevented attempt are in the range of DM 210.000,--.

Photo Documentation« PLUS PROJECT »