CHAPTER 4

A SHIP EMANATING FROM THE BALTIC PHENOMENON

The attached report - made up by ADC Support AB, Stockholm on request of the JAIC - contains a historical overview of the ferry traffic between Finland and Sweden with the rapidly growing number of passengers as well as of cars/trucks and the rapidly growing ferries.

The VIKING SALLY, designed and constructed to cope with this fast development - called "The Baltic Phenomenon" - was considered the trend-setter when she took up service in the early 1980's with Viking Line. The effect of competition between the two main operators in these trades, i.e. Silja and Viking, on the design and construction of the ever growing ferries, and even on the safety philosophy of the two operators, is clearly outlined.

Also the development between 1959 and 1993 of the visor with ramp house construction - called "garage" in the report - in comparison to other visor constructions and bow doors on Silja and Viking Line ferries was examined in the report. The result is that Silja commissioned 25 ferries during these 34 years, of which 7 were fitted with a visor/ramp house construction, the last ones being the FINLANDIA and SILJA REGINA commissioned in 1981. Viking Line did bring 41 ferries into service, of which 27 had a visor/ramp house construction, the last ones being the OLYMPIA in 1986 (sailing in P&O charter as PRIDE OF BILBAO between Southampton and Bilbao/Spain since her sale) and ALANDFÅRJAN in 1987. This demonstrates that it was absolutely common in those years, and in conformity with the state-of-the-art, to apply this construction - bow ramp extending into a ramp house which was part of the visor.

The report further discusses the safety culture existing for decades within the Silja and Viking organisations and on the basis of which the "ships" navigation and operation at sea was not considered to be a main "risk factor" as the long-term experience had proved.

The collective record of Silja and Viking Lines from 1960 to 1995 is five killed passengers on 107 million passenger single trips, i.e. one casualty per almost 18 million single trips. Moreover, these 5 passengers were killed in one collision in a narrow fairway.

As to ESTONIA's crew recruited exclusively from ESCO staff, the author indicates by means of comparison between the power/breadth ratios of the Silja/Viking ferries in 1993, which was between 700-1000 kW/m and the ESCO vessels at the same time, which was between 100-300 kW/m except for GEORG OTTS being 600 kW/m, that the ESTONIA crew might not have had sufficient experience to handle the vessel competently.

The report has been prepared by the Naval Architect Hans Wermelin, thus from the point of view of a naval architect based on his knowledge at the end of 1995.Consequently it ends with the following remarks:

»This overview with the explanations of the work with safety is contrasting to the Estonia catastrophe. The reason is that until this happened the design philosophy was that big volumes of water should not enter into cargo deck when the ship was properly closed at sea. When the catastrophe showed this was a false philosophy an intensive work started to make these ships safe regardless of water on cargo deck. In fact this work was already started after the catastrophe with the Herald of Free Enterprise. Thus the latest purposely built ships in the trade manage to carry a lot of water on the cargo deck: M/S Silja Symphony and M/S Silja Serenade manage one meter and M/S Silja Europa has to sink before she capsizes.«

The Report is attached as Enclosure 4.106.